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Abstract 
Genuine saving is an established indicator of weak sustainable development that measures the 
net level of investment a country makes in produced, natural and human capital less 
depreciation. Maintaining this net level of investment above zero is a necessary condition for 
sustainable development. However, data demonstrate that resource-rich countries are 
systematically failing to make this investment. Alongside the familiar resource curse on 
economic growth, resource abundance has a negative effect on genuine saving. In fact, the 
two are closely related insofar as future consumption growth is restricted by insufficient 
genuine saving now. In this paper, we apply the most convincing conclusion from the 
literature on economic growth – that it is institutional failure that depresses growth – to data 
on genuine saving. We regress genuine saving on four indicators of institutional quality in 
interaction with an indicator of resource abundance. The indicators of institutional quality are 
corruption, bureaucratic quality, the rule of law and political constraints on the executive. We 
find that reducing corruption has a positive impact on genuine savings that is robust across 
different estimation procedures. 
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Genuine saving (hereafter GS) is an established measure of weak sustainable development. In 
economic terms, development is not sustainable if an economy’s total stock of capital is not 
maintained, that is if the GS rate is (persistently) allowed to drop below zero. Weak 
sustainable development assumes that natural and produced forms of capital are infinitely 
substitutable (Neumayer 1999, 2003).
1 Since its development in the mid-1990s, the World 
Bank (2004) has calculated GS rates retrospectively for more than 150 countries between 
1970 and the present day. Although it finds that global GS rates have consistently been above 
zero and therefore above what one might call the ‘unsustainability threshold’ of zero, over the 
whole of this period GS rates have been alarmingly low and consistently below zero in certain 
countries of the world. Significantly, these countries are also generally resource-rich. 
 
This observation is strongly reminiscent of the so-called ‘resource curse’ hypothesis in the 
economic growth literature: the phenomenon that resource-rich economies generally grow 
more slowly than resource-poor economies although, in theory at least, they have the means 
to invest in productive forms of capital. The link between the negative effect of resource 
abundance on GS and the resource curse on economic growth is therefore the failure of 
resource-rich countries to invest enough of their resource rents in other forms of capital. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the resource curse on economic growth has generated a substantial literature 
over the past half-century or more that has sought to explain it (Auty 2001; Isham et al. 2003; 
Gylfason 2001; Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003). Many 
explanations have been put forward and one can broadly distinguish between more directly 
economic explanations and political-economic explanations that highlight the role of policy 
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difficult to resist the conclusion that it is political-economic failures that have been the root 
cause of slow growth. We draw succour from this finding and examine whether low GS rates 
in resource-rich countries can similarly be explained by particular political and institutional 
failings. More specifically, we test whether improving institutional quality in selected, distinct 
ways leads resource-rich countries to invest their resource rents more sustainably in other 
forms of capital. Section 2 explains GS in more detail, and outlines the empirical finding that 
resource abundance is negatively related to GS. Section 3 discusses the resource curse in 
terms of the growth literature. Section 4 explains our empirical strategy, section 5 outlines our 
results and section 6 provides a discussion. 
 
2. Genuine saving and resource abundance: the unsustainable consumption of resource 
rents 
 
The origins of GS can be traced back to the work of Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1977), who 
were concerned with modelling a development path in which social welfare does not decline 
in an economy exploiting a non-renewable resource. Given a range of simplifying 
assumptions
2, the economic planner’s problem is to maximise the present value of social 
welfare over all time. Her task is to achieve an optimal mix of consumption and investment. 
Solving the maximisation problem produces a measure of net national product or NNP, which 
is equal to society’s consumption plus the sum of net changes in the capital stocks valued at 
their shadow prices. It is possible to ‘green’ the optimisation model by including natural 
capital and further expand the measure by including human capital. The term ‘genuine’ was 
thus coined by Hamilton (1994) to reflect the fact that GS includes all forms of capital that 
generate utility. 
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It is the sum of net changes in all the capital stocks valued at their shadow prices minus 
consumption (i.e. NNP minus consumption) that is GS. Circumnavigating the rather complex 
construction and derivation (see Hamilton and Clemens, 1999): 
 
GS = net investment in produced capital – net depreciation of natural capital  (1) 
+ investment in human capital 
 
Keeping GS above or equal to zero is a necessary (but not sufficient condition) for ensuring 
sustainability under the weak sustainability paradigm. If GS is persistently below zero, then 
the economy is certainly not weakly sustainable, since future utility must be below current 
utility at some time in the future (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999). 
 
The World Bank calculates GS, which it now calls “adjusted net saving” as follows: 
 
GS = investment in produced capital – net foreign borrowing + net official transfers – 
depreciation of produced capital – net depreciation of natural capital 
+  current  education  expenditures        (2) 
 
  Investment in produced capital, net foreign borrowing and net official transfers are 
obtained from the national accounts. Although depreciation of produced capital is not, 
estimates can be derived from data on produced capital formation. The World Bank 
uses estimates undertaken by the United Nations Statistics Division. Note that net 
investment in produced capital and foreign assets are aggregated across both the 
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government consumption or investment to explain GS rates.  
  Net depreciation of natural capital can be divided at a basic level into resource 
extraction on the one hand and environmental pollution on the other. The latter is 
conceptualised as the use of sink capacity in order for it to be equivalent to capital 
depreciation. The Bank estimates resource extraction for a range of fossil fuels (oil, 
natural gas, hard coal and brown coal), minerals (bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, 
zinc, phosphate, tin, gold and silver), and one renewable resource (forests). Note that 
due to data limitations there are a great many resources omitted, particularly 
renewable resources such as water resources, fisheries and soils etc. Depreciation of 
natural capital due to resource depletion is computed as the product of price minus 
average costs of extraction multiplied by the volume of extraction: 
 
(P-AC)*R          ( 3 )  
 
where P is the resource price, AC is average cost and R is the volume of extraction (in 
the case of a renewable resource R represents harvest beyond natural regeneration). 
Average costs are used instead of the theoretically correct marginal costs due to a lack 
of data.
3 Environmental pollution is taken to be the estimated damage cost of carbon 
dioxide emissions, where each ton of carbon emitted is valued at US$20 per metric 
tonne of carbon (from Fankhauser, 1995). Note that we omit this change in the capital 
stock, following Ferreira and Vincent (2003). This is justified, because the damage 
cost of carbon dioxide emissions is not equivalent to the environmental capital stock 
that determines the impact of climate change on a country’s economy. Instead, it is the 
global concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, a function of global 
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estimations if the cost of carbon dioxide emissions is included in the GS measure. 
  Investment in human capital is calculated as net educational expenditures. This 
includes both capital expenditures as well as current expenditures that are counted as 
consumption rather than investment in the traditional national accounts. This is 
certainly rather crude, but it is difficult to see how investment in human capital could 
be estimated otherwise for so many countries over such a long time horizon. Dasgupta 
(2001, p.C9f.) argues that it is an overestimate since human capital is lost when people 
die. Against this one might object that part of the human capital stock might have been 
passed on so that it is not really lost once individuals die or, to be precise, leave the 
workforce. In any case, such a correction would be difficult to undertake. 
 
World Bank GS estimates for the period 1970-2001 have shown significant differences from 
country to country. One important trend to emerge is that resource-rich countries are the 
poorest genuine savers (see also Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). Figure 1 plots period-average 
GS rates against resource abundance for 145 countries. Resource abundance is measured as 
the average share of fuel and mineral product exports in total exports. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 around here > 
 
With the exception of Algeria and Guinea, for whom GS was just above zero for the period 
1970-2001, every country with an average share of fuel and mineral exports in total exports of 
over 60% had negative GS. In contrast, most resource-poor countries, especially the cluster of 
countries with an average share of fuel and mineral exports in total exports of under 20%, had 
positive GS. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it must also be said that net produced capital investment 
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decreasing, and the World Bank’s estimates of net natural capital depreciation simply worsen 
the situation. This is the case in Guinea-Bissau, for example. Nevertheless, one important 
conclusion we can draw from the World Bank’s data is that the countries with the greatest 
natural resource extraction are also the poorest performers in terms of GS (Neumayer, 1999). 
Put another way, they are failing to invest a sufficient proportion of their resource rents in 
other forms of capital. This is striking, because it bears a considerable similarity to arguments 
made with respect to the effect of natural resource intensity on economic growth. 
 
3. The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis and policy failure 
 
“One of the surprising features of economic life is that resource-poor economies often vastly 
outperform resource-rich economies in economic growth” (Sachs and Warner, 1995, p2). 
Instances of this can be found throughout modern history. Although Auty (2001) correctly 
points out that there are exceptions to the rule
4, it is especially true of the post-1970 period. 
Between 1970 and 1993, per capita GDP in resource-rich countries grew around three times 
faster than it did in resource-poor countries (Auty, 2001). Perhaps this is because resource-
abundance masks underlying trends in other determinants of economic growth such as trade 
policy and government efficiency. However, Sachs and Warner (1995) demonstrated that, 
even after controlling for these factors, resource-abundance is negatively related to growth. 
The phenomenon has become known as the ‘resource curse’. 
 
We might expect growth in agricultural economies to be slower than in manufacturing-led 
economies (Mellor, 1995), but the fact that fuel and mineral-rich economies perform 
especially poorly in relation to manufacturing economies (Auty, 2001) is a paradox. On the 
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growth both in the short and medium-term, as long as they invest the proceeds of their 
resource windfalls in other productive forms of capital. This is the formal link between the 
resource curse on economic growth and the negative effect of resource abundance on GS: 
productive capital investment is insufficient in resource-rich countries. Weitzman (1976) 
showed that, since NNP at time t is equivalent to consumption plus the value of changes in the 
capital stocks w ˙, then   
 
  c c w − = &            ( 4 )  
 
where c  is the stationary equivalent of future consumption: in other words, the hypothetical 
constant consumption level that would yield the same present value as the actual future 
consumption path (Ferreira and Vincent, 2003). Equation (4) thus implies that the greater is 
the level of investment in the capital stock at time t relative to consumption, the greater is the 
increase in consumption that can be achieved between t and all future times. Understandably, 
researchers have devoted increasing attention to explaining exactly why resource-rich 
countries fail to make the productive investments necessary to achieve stronger growth. We 
are especially interested in the outcome of this literature because of the strong connections it 
has with the negative effect of resource abundance on GS: it may help to cast some light on 
the causes of low GS in resource-rich countries. 
 
A number of explanations of the resource curse have been put forward. One popular set of 
explanations, dating back at least to the 1940s, points the finger at the economic performance 
of the natural resources sector compared to the manufacturing sector. Primary resource prices 
have historically followed a path of secular decline (Prebisch, 1962). In addition, economies 
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fluctuations (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003), and another theory suggests that demand 
for manufactures grows faster than demand for primary products. But we must ask why 
resource-rich countries have not succeeded in diversifying? As we have said, resource-rich 
countries ought to be able to invest their resource rents in other forms of capital, and lay the 
foundations for faster and enduring growth. 
 
One reason why they might not is so-called ‘Dutch disease’. Dutch disease can set in 
following the discovery of new resource stocks. The positive shock to the economy leads the 
real exchange rate (or real wages) to over-appreciate, which perversely causes the tradeable 
non-resource sector – in particular manufacturing – to contract in the face of less competitive 
conditions. Many economists believe that the manufacturing sector (and indeed the service 
sector) produces more positive externalities than the natural resources sector – based on 
learning-by-doing – and thus the contraction of the manufacturing sector in relative terms 
could lead to a fall in economic activity in absolute terms (Hirschman, 1958; Matsuyama, 
1992). From an investment perspective, there may not be an incentive to invest in 
manufactures under these circumstances. 
 
Resource-rich countries may also lack the incentive to make productive investments in human 
capital through educational expenditure (Birdsall et al., 2001; Gylfason, 2001). This may be 
connected to Dutch disease, insofar as currency appreciation may reduce the relative rate of 
return to educational investments. However, it seems more plausible to suggest that it is a 
failure of public policy that causes this underinvestment. Either governments with abundant 
natural resources are blind to the need to invest in human capital because they see themselves 
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more generally to a political-economic explanation of the resource curse. 
 
Resource-rich countries may underperform economically because the potential to ‘cash in’ on 
natural resource rents has an unsettling and inhibiting effect on the country’s political 
economy. The availability of resource rents leads to rapacious rent-seeking behaviour (Lane 
and Tornell, 1995; Torvik, 2002). One of the most appealing arguments is then that these rent-
seeking opportunities give rise to corruption. There are multiple reasons why corruption may 
in turn slow economic growth by reducing investment (Mauro, 1995) and the productivity of 
investment, which might explain why some find resource abundance influences growth 
through the investment channel (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2003). 
 
There are at least three reasons why corruption leads to underinvestment: (i) rent-seeking 
redirects resources from productive investment; (ii) corruption reduces the flow of new goods 
and technology through a de facto tax on ex post profits (Romer, 1994); and (iii) corruption 
generates uncertainty (Boycko et al., 1995). Corruption also tends to make what investment 
there is less productive, because the projects benefiting from corrupt practices are those most 
successful at rent seeking, rather than necessarily those offering the greatest return (Murphy et 
al., 1991). In this way, resources are reallocated from productive to rent-seeking activity. This 
will have a direct negative impact on economic performance. In addition, the efforts that must 
be made to avoid detection and punishment distort the economy. One aspect of this is that 
corrupt officials may tend towards financing projects for which the collection of bribes is 
easier. Once again, this is unlikely to be the most productive use of project finance. Leite and 
Weidmann (1999), in an important contribution, found that corruption had a negative effect 
on economic growth. 
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However, Isham et al. (2003) identify three other ways in which resource abundance stunts 
the development of a healthy political economy: (i) rentier effects; (ii) delayed modernisation; 
and (iii) an entrenched inequality effect. A rentier state finds it easy to extract significant 
revenues from concentrated sources. Clearly, states with abundant mineral and oil reserves are 
rentier states, since the resources are concentrated geographically and in terms of ownership. 
Given the revenues the government gains, it has a reduced incentive to tax the general 
population and with that to develop governance mechanisms. On the opposite side, citizens 
have less incentive to develop mechanisms of accountability and form the healthy ‘civil 
society’ that is believed to be a pre-requisite of democracy (e.g. Putnam, 1993). In addition, 
the government can rely on its resource revenues to repress dissent, either through buying off 
opposition (often with high-profile ‘white elephant’ infrastructure projects) or through 
violence. Moreover, since the state sector tends to dominate in rentier economies, an 
independent middle class fails to develop, and technocratic and entrepreneurial talent remains 
captive of state largesse in terms of employment and advancement opportunities (Chaudhry, 
1997). As a result of this and other factors, democracy often fails to develop in rentier states 
(Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001). 
 
The so-called delayed modernisation and entrenched inequality effects are quite similar. 
Political elites find it relatively easy to control resources and maintain their wealth in a point 
resource-led economy, but face the prospect of loosing their grip through industrialisation and 
urbanisation (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Moore, 1967). It follows that political elites in resource-
rich countries resist modernisation pressures for as long as possible, especially investment in 
the manufacturing sector. It is at this point that we find a link back to the economic arguments 
made above, since resisting modernisation exposes the economy to the long-term decline in 
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this is that the concentration of capital ownership among political elites, together with 
production methods that favour the use of expert (foreign) labour and that are capital-
intensive (Auty and Kiiski, 2001), reproduce social inequalities between those inside the elite 
and those outside it. This is the entrenched inequality explanation. 
 
In fact, policy failure underpins any explanation of the resource curse, even the more strictly 
economic ones. For example, judicious management of natural resource endowments will 
prevent the generation of too much income too quickly that is the root cause of Dutch disease. 
In Norway, for example, the government takes around 80% of resource rents in taxes and fees 
and invests that amount in foreign assets (Gylfason, 2001). Indeed, Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) test directly whether it was exogenous macro-economic effects or 
endogenous policy failure that caused slow growth in resource-abundant countries. They find 
that natural resources appear to have a significantly negative and robust effect on growth, but 
that once institutions are controlled for they had either no effect or a small positive effect. 
Neither of the macro-economic variables – commodity price volatility and overvaluation of 
the exchange rate (Dutch disease) – was significant. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) also 
provide tentative evidence that resource-rich countries were wasting their resource rents on 
government consumption, and that gross saving rates were lower in resource-rich countries 
with poor quality institutions (based on Sachs and Warner’s (1997) aggregate index of various 
dimensions of institutional quality). This result also suggests that resource abundance is not a 
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explained by policy failure. In section 2 we demonstrated that resource abundance also seems 
to have a negative effect on GS. We will specify a model to explain genuine saving based on 
the interaction between natural resource endowments and institutional quality. The question 
remains, however, what element(s) of institutional quality seem to be important for economic 
performance a priori? 
 
Corruption is intuitively appealing, not just because of its apparent impact on economic 
growth but rather because of its specific effect on investment. To the extent that corruption 
leads to underinvestment in physical and human capital and overconsumption of natural 
resources, the GS indicator should pick this up. However, work by Isham et al. (2003) 
suggests that we should test for other indicators of institutional quality as well. We test 
measures of bureaucratic quality, the rule of law and a measure of constraints on changing 
existing policy regimes. Following Isham et al. (2003), we decline to apportion these three 
indicators to particular theories. Instead, we test whether it is indeed true that these wider 
political economy effects depress genuine savings, or whether it is corruption in particular 
that matters. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
We model variations in GS in a panel of data spanning up to 155 countries and 31 years. We 
specify a reduced-form model, with a particular focus on the interaction between resource 
abundance, which should have a negative effect on GS ceteris paribus, and indicators of 
institutional quality. However, it will also be important to capture determinants of gross 
saving, since GS is itself a ‘green’ extension of gross saving. Put another way, we want to 
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specific conclusions about the unsustainable consumption of natural resource rents. Therefore 
our first task is to select determinants of gross saving as control variables, based on the 
literature. 
 
Determinants of gross saving 
 
Within the last fifteen years, a number of studies have analysed the empirical determinants of 
gross private or gross national saving
5 using panel data and reduced-form models. The studies 
that we draw upon are listed in table I, including data panel sizes and saving measures 
analysed. 
 
< Insert Table I around here > 
 
Across all studies, three thematic variables appear to have a robust and significant effect on 
gross saving: (i) income (per capita and growth), (ii) age dependency and (iii) urbanisation. 
Income per capita and income growth have a positive effect on gross (private) saving. Age 
dependency has a negative effect on gross saving, and in the empirical studies, urbanisation 
tends to have a negative effect on gross saving. 
 
A number of other variables are tested in the above studies. We choose not to include them 
for three reasons. Firstly, some are generally insignificant in the empirical literature. These 
include macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates and terms-of-trade. Secondly, data 
are very limited. These include detailed indicators of financial liberalisation, social security 
systems and income inequality. Thirdly, some are components of GS, and therefore including 
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side and the right-hand side of the equation. These include fiscal policy variables such as 
government consumption and fiscal surplus. 
 
Hypothesis and data 
 
We test the hypothesis that, after controlling for the determinants of gross saving, resource-
rich countries have lower rates of genuine saving than resource-poor countries. However, 
this effect is likely due to policy failure and raising political/institutional standards in these 
countries will lead to greater investment of resource rents in other forms of capital, and to 
higher rates of genuine saving. 
 
We test this hypothesis with the following model: 
 
t i t t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i t i
T RS Inst Rs
Inst Urban Age Growth Y GS
, , , 7 , 6




β β β β β α
+ + + +
+ + + + + = −     (5) 
 
for country i at time t, where ε is an error term. The year dummies T allow for global changes 
in GS over time not otherwise accounted for in the explanatory variables. 
 
GS is genuine saving. Data are available for the period 1970-2001 and are taken from the 
World Bank
6; lnY is gross national income per capita. We take the natural log to account for 
positive skewness. Growth is GDP growth, which is lagged one year to mitigate potential 
endogeneity bias; Age is age dependency; Urban is a measure of urbanisation: the percentage 
of the total population living in urban areas. Data for all these variables are taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online database (World Bank, 2004). 
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Inst is institutional quality. We separately test four indicators of institutional quality. Indices 
of (i) corruption, (ii) bureaucratic quality and (iii) the rule of law are taken from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). These are scaled from 0, which indicates poor 
quality institutions (e.g. the highest corruption and the lowest bureaucratic quality) to 6, 
which indicates high quality institutions (e.g. the lowest corruption and the highest 
bureaucratic quality)
7. The indices are compiled in an attempt to assess the investment risk 
faced by multinational companies and are based on expert judgements. Insofar as they ought 
to be positively related to investment, they are promising for our purposes. Unfortunately, the 
ICRG variables are only available for the period 1984 to 2001. In addition we test a measure 
of ‘political constraints’ (POLCON) that has been developed by Witold Henisz (2000). 
Henisz has designed POLCON as an indicator of the ability of political institutions to make 
credible commitments to an existing policy regime, which he argues is the most relevant 
political variable of interest to investors. Building on a simple spatial model of political 
interaction, POLCON makes use of the structure of government in a given country and the 
political views represented by the different levels of government (i.e. the executive, the 
legislature) to do so. It measures the extent to which political actors are constrained in their 
choice of future policies by the existence of other political actors whose consent needs to be 
achieved. Scores range from 0, which indicates that the executive has total political discretion 
and could change existing policy regimes at any point of time, to 1, which indicates that a 
change of existing policy regimes is totally infeasible. Of course in practice agreement is 
always feasible, so the maximum score is less than 1. 
 
lnRs is a measure of resource abundance, which we take to be the combined share of fossil 
fuel and mineral product in total exports (World Bank, 2004). This is similar to the measure 
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which has been widely criticised as Sachs and Warner (2001) admit. A more accurate and 
direct indicator of resource extraction might be resource rents, data for which are available 
from the GS database. However, since resource rents are an actual constituent of GS, 
including them would generate a partial identity. We take the natural log of Rs to account for 
positive skewness. 
 
lnY, Growth, Age, and Urban are the control variables. Inst, lnRs and its interaction term are 
the main variables of interest. We expect lnRs to have a negative effect on GS. However, if 
raising the standard of institutions in resource-rich countries reduces the unsustainable 
consumption of resource rents, then we would expect the interaction term Inst*lnRs to be 
positive. lnRs  is the predictor variable and Inst is the moderator variable, such that the 
negative relationship between resource abundance and GS becomes more positive – i.e. 
improves – the better are the political institutions. Where the interaction term is significant, 
one cannot interpret the coefficients on the individual components lnRs and Inst in the 
conventional way. Instead, the coefficient on lnRs in a model with a significant interaction 




We first estimate equation (5) with fixed effects, a design that allows for unobserved time-
invariant variation in country-specific factors, with standard errors that are robust toward 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. We then estimate (5) using the Arellano-
Bond one-step procedure (Arellano and Bond, 1991) with robust standard errors. This 
estimator has two advantages over and above the static fixed effects estimator. Firstly, it 
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and of the explanatory variables. This accounts for the inertia that is almost certainly present 
in the determination of saving rates (Loayza et al., 2000). Secondly, it allows us to mitigate 
for potential endogeneity problems: that some of the explanatory variables are likely to be 
jointly determined with GS. The Arellano-Bond estimator is a generalised-method-of-
moments (GMM) estimator. It is constructed by first-differencing equation (5), producing: 
 
) ( ) ( ' 1 , , 1 , 1 , , − − − − + − = − t i t i it t i t i t i X X GS GS ε ε β       ( 6 )  
 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables. First differencing removes the country-specific 
effect, but introduces, by construction, a correlation between the differenced lagged GS rate 
and the differenced error term. In addition, one must find a way to account for potential 
endogeneity in the explanatory variables. This is done by using internal instruments: i.e. 
instruments based on the lagged values of the explanatory variables. Note that in this case 
there is no need to lag GDP growth by one year. 
 
Although the Arellano-Bond estimator has advantages over a static fixed effects estimator, it 
also suffers from problems. The use of instrumental variables leads to rather inefficient 
estimation with high standard errors. Moreover, whilst first-order serial correlation is 
expected, second-order serial correlation indicates that the original error term is serially 
correlated, which renders the estimations inconsistent. Fortunately, our tests for second-order 
autocorrelation suggest that this does not represent a problem in our data. 
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Table II reports summary statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix. Although the corruption, 
bureaucratic quality and rule of law indices are all compiled by ICRG, the correlations 
between them are not especially high. In particular, the strength of correlation between 
corruption and bureaucratic quality and between corruption and the rule of law is only 
moderate (0.54 and 0.52 respectively). The correlations between POLCON and the ICRG 
indices are also moderate. There may indeed be a possibility of detecting different effects 
between the various measures of institutional quality and GS. 
 
< Insert Table II around here > 
 
 
Table III reports the results of four static fixed effects estimations of equation (5), each 
applying a different indicator of institutional quality. Of the control variables, GNI per capita 
and GDP growth are significant and positive determinants of GS in all models. Age 
dependency is significant and negative only in the POLCON model. However, this sample 
also has by some way the largest number of observations, so the statistical power of the 
POLCON model is in any case higher. Urbanisation is not significant in any of the four 
models. Resource exports, our measure of resource abundance, is significant at the 1% level 
and negative in all four models. 
 
< Insert Table III around here > 
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between the various indicators of institutional quality and resource exports. The interaction 
between lack of corruption and resource exports is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
The specific interpretation of this variable is that the negative relationship between resource 
exports and GS becomes more positive the less corruption there is. Reducing corruption by 
one index point increases the slope of resource exports on GS by 0.36 units. The coefficient 
on resource exports in table III shows the slope of resource exports on GS at a corruption 
index score of 0. Therefore, a one unit increase in resource exports leads to a decrease in GS 
of 4% in states with the most corruption. We can make use of the interaction term coefficient 
to estimate the slope of resource exports on GS at higher scores on the corruption index. At 
the mean index score of 3.6, a one unit increase in resource exports leads to a decrease in GS 
of only 2.7% (4-3.6*0.36), and at the maximum index score of 6 (i.e. in the least corrupt state), 
a one unit increase in resource exports leads to a decrease in GS of just 1.8% (4-6*0.36). 
Reducing corruption from the maximum to the minimum reduces the negative effect of 
resource abundance on GS by 55%. Clearly, on this basis, resource abundant countries can 
strike a more sustainable balance between the consumption and investment of their resource 
rents if they make efforts to reduce corruption. 
 
The interactions between bureaucratic quality and resource exports and between the rule of 
law and resource exports are not significant. According to our results, improvements in these 
aspects of the political economy will in themselves not lead to higher GS. The interaction 
between POLCON and resource exports is significant at the 10% level and positive. For a one 
unit increase in political constraints, the slope of resource abundance on GS increases by 0.8 
units. When there are no political constraints and POLCON is equal to zero, a one unit 
increase in resource exports leads to a 1.7% fall in GS. At the mean POLCON score of 0.44, a 
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score of 0.89 (the highest level of political constraints), a one unit increase in resource exports 
leads to a 1.0% fall in GS. Increasing political constraints from the minimum to the maximum 
reduces the negative effect of resource abundance on GS by 59%. However, it is worth 
repeating that there are many more observations in the POLCON model, so statistical power 
is generally higher. 
 
Table IV reports the results of our alternative estimations with the Arellano-Bond model. In 
this case, GS is also regressed on itself and is positive and significant in all cases. This 
demonstrates the inertia inherent in the determination of GS that we speculated upon earlier. 
Of the control variables, GNI per capita and urbanisation are insignificant. However, there is 
reason to expect GNI per capita to be endogenous. It follows that relaxing the assumption of 
strict exogeneity in the Arellano-Bond model could cause GNI per capita to become 
insignificant. GDP growth is significant and positive in all four models, while age 
dependency is significant and negative. Resource exports are not significant and negative 
across all four models, as was the case in the static fixed effects model. 
 
< Insert Table IV around here > 
 
The interaction effect between lack of corruption and resource exports is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. Indeed, for a one index point reduction in corruption, the slope of 
resource exports on GS increases by 0.7 units. When corruption is at its highest – at an index 
score of zero – a one unit increase in resource exports leads GS to fall by 1.7%. At the mean 
corruption index score of 3.6, a one unit increase in resource exports leads to an increase in 
GS of 0.8%, and at the maximum index score of 6 (i.e. in the least corrupt state), a one unit 
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minimum corruption reduces the negative effect of resource abundance on GS by 247%, 
reversing it. These data lend considerable support to the interpretation of the static fixed 
effects model, which tentatively showed that reducing corruption could help to put resource-
rich countries on a more sustainable path. Neither bureaucratic quality, the rule of law nor 
POLCON are significant in interaction with resource rents. However, we note that the 
coefficient on POLCON is significant at the 1% level and negative. On the face of it, this is 
the opposite result to that which we would expect but, according to the rules for interpreting 
coefficients in interaction models, this simply shows the slope of POLCON on GS when log 
resource exports are equal to zero. When log resource exports are equal to zero, resource 
exports in levels are equal to just over zero. Furthermore, we have chosen to interpret the 
interaction effect in such a way that it is POLCON that may moderate the relationship 
between resource rents and GS. This interpretation is supported in the literature. In order to 
interpret the POLCON variable, we would have to hypothesise that resource rents moderate 
the relationship between POLCON and GS. The direction of causation is thus reversed, and 
there is no theoretical reason to expect resource rents to drive the relationship between 
POLCON and GS. 
 
There may nevertheless be a theoretical reason why POLCON has an ambiguous relationship 
with GS. The index is constructed on the premise that increasing constraints on the ability of 
political actors to make unilateral decisions is good for investment, because in a constrained 
system actors can make credible commitments to an existing policy regime. However, as 
Henisz (2000) himself concedes, one can quite easily find examples of states with few 
political constraints but solid economic performance. Taking China as an example, it has a 
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In tables 2 to 4 we have presented evidence on the relationship between institutional quality, 
resource abundance and GS. We asked the question, does improving the quality of various 
aspects of a country’s political and bureaucratic institutions (both subjectively and objectively 
determined) result in a more sustainable mix of consumption and investment of resource 
rents? The World Bank’s own estimates show that it is the most resource-abundant regions of 
the world that have been the poorest genuine savers over the last thirty years. Given that GS 
subtracts resource rents from net fixed capital formation and educational expenditures (as well 
as subtracting carbon dioxide emissions), this amounts to an unsustainable consumption of 
resource rents. More should have been invested in other forms of capital, if these regions were 
to pursue a more sustainable path. 
 
There are strong connections between these findings and the so-called ‘resource curse’ 
hypothesis in relation to economic growth. That is, resource-rich economies have historically 
grown more slowly than resource-poor economies, particularly in the last thirty years or so. 
This is apparently paradoxical, since resource extraction should generate the income to make 
productive investments in other forms of capital. Resource-rich countries fail to do this. 
Although some direct economic explanations of the resource curse have been put forward in 
the past with a modicum of success – most notably ‘Dutch disease’ effects – it is ultimately 
policy failure that underpins the curse. This has inspired us to test whether improving 
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GS. 
 
However, institutional quality is a broad concept and it has been necessary to refine what we 
mean and what we test. There are persuasive theoretical and empirical arguments in the 
literature that suggest corruption may be a major explanatory factor of the resource curse. 
They often describe a process in which investment is either misdirected or discouraged 
altogether. A failure to invest resource rents would depress GS, ceteris paribus. In addition, 
there are arguments for wider political economy effects, summarised in Isham et al. (2003). 
These explain the resource curse in terms of the control exerted by political elites over 
resource rents. There is little incentive to develop a competent government bureaucracy and to 
diversify the national economy into other sectors, a process that the political elites resist 
through a combination of undemocratic decision-making and repression of more-or-less 
violent forms. 
 
Therefore we have tested four competing indicators of institutional quality in the framework 
of our hypothesis. We have tested corruption, using the ICRG index. In addition, we have 
tested bureaucratic quality and rule of law indices, also from ICRG, and POLCON (Henisz, 
2000), an indicator of political constraints on decision-making. On the basis of our evidence, 
we suggest that corruption is a significant cause of low GS in resource rich countries, because 
it depresses investment. In both static fixed effects and dynamic estimations, the hitherto 
negative relationship between resource exports and GS improves as corruption is reduced. 
Although there is evidence in the static fixed effects model that political constraints may do 
the same, we do not find that these results are robust toward extending the estimation to a 
dynamic framework, and the magnitude of the effects are lower than for corruption. This is 
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very persuasive reasons why all aspects of institutional quality should be improved. Indeed, 
improvements on one dimension are almost certain to lead to improvements in others. 
Nevertheless, in order to put themselves on a more sustainable investment pathway, we 
recommend that resource-rich countries strive to reduce the corrupt practices that stymie 
investment and make it unproductive. 
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1 As opposed to strong sustainable development, which assumes natural capital is either partly or wholly non-
substitutable. 
2 See Dietz and Neumayer (forthcoming). 
3 In addition, there is some controversy over this method, which approximates the total Hotelling rent. See 
Neumayer (2000). 
4 For example, the growth of resource-abundant new European colonies in the late nineteenth century. 
5 Where gross national saving = gross private saving + gross public saving. 
6 Hhttp://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/envext.nsf/44ByDocName/GreenAccountingAdjustedNetSavingsH  
7 Until 1996, bureaucratic quality was scored 0-4. We rescale this data to lie between 0 and 6. However, none of 
the observations in our sample actually have a score of zero. 
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This version: May 2004Table I. Empirical studies of the determinants of gross saving. 
 
Study  Data panel  Saving type 
Edwards (1996)  36 countries (11 
industrialised; 25 
developing) over 22 years  
Private saving 
Dayal-Ghulati and Thimann 
(1997) 
5 Asian (ASEAN) and 9 
Latin American countries 
over 20 years 
Private saving 
Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Servén (2000) 
World Bank’s new Saving 
Project World Database 
(up to 35 years and 134 
countries) 
National, public, private 
and household saving 
Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(1991) 
13 developing countries 
over just 7 years 
Private saving 
Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei 
(1998) 
21 industrial countries and 
40 developing countries 
over 22 and 11 years 
respectively 
Private saving 
Haque, Pesaran and Sharma 
(1999) 
21 industrial countries and 
40 developing countries 
over 22 and 11 years 
respectively  
Private saving 
Samwick (2000)  World Bank’s new Saving 
Project World Database 
(up to 35 years and 134 
countries) 
National, public, private 
and household saving 
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This version: May 2004Table II. Summary statistics and correlation matrix (N = 1938). 
 
      Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.
Genuine Saving/GNI  8.05  11.19  -54.89  44.32 
GNI per capita (ln)  7.82  1.45  4.70  10.69 
GDP growth (lagged one year)  3.54  4.57  -26.48  33.99 
Age  dependency         
         
         
0.68 0.18 0.37 1.14
Urbanisation 58.31 22.86 4.56 100
Resource exports (ln)  2.21  1.55  -5.93  4.59 
Lack of corruption  3.60  1.37  0  6 
Bureaucratic quality  3.97  1.42  1  6 
Rule of law  4.05  1.54  0  6 
POLCON 0.44 0.34 0 0.89
  GS/GNI  GNI per capita  GDP growth  Age dependency  Urbanisation  Resource exports  Lack of 
Corruption 
Bureaucratic quality  Rule of law  POLCON 
Genuine Saving/GNI  1.00                   
GNI per capita (ln)  0.21  1.00                 
GDP growth  0.16  -0.08  1.00               
Age dependency  -0.34  -0.75  0.04  1.00             
Urbanisation                 
                   
-0.08 0.80 -0.09 -0.63 1.00
Resource exports (ln)  -0.38  0.03  -0.01  0.10  0.16  1.00         
Lack of corruption  0.03  0.53  -0.07  -0.31  0.28  -0.13  1.00       
Bureaucratic quality  0.30  0.77  -0.01  -0.64  0.51  -0.04  0.54  1.00     
Rule of law  0.16  0.71  0.01  -0.62  0.48  -0.02  0.52  0.72  1.00   
POLCON 0.26 0.65 -0.08 -0.63 0.49 -0.15 0.37 0.60 0.58  1.00
34 
This version: May 2004Table III. Static fixed effects estimates (robust standard errors in parenthesis). 
 




‘Rule of law’  ‘POLCON’ 








































Lack of corruption  -0.391 
(0.418) 
   
Bureaucratic quality    0.318 
(0.448) 
  
Rule of law      -0.495 
(0.375) 
 
POLCON       -1.859 
(1.148) 
Resource exports (ln) 
*Lack of corruption 
0.357* 
(0.194) 
   





Resource exports (ln) 
*Rule of law 
   0.215 
(0.162) 
 
Resource exports (ln) 
*POLCON 
    0.784* 
(0.451) 
R
2  within  0.19 0.23 0.22 0.14 
N  observations  1036 1158 1158 1938 
N  countries  99  107 107 118 
 
Note: Dependent variable is GS rate (GS/GNI). Year dummies included, but coefficients not 
shown.   * Significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
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Lack of corruption  -0.718 
(0.539) 
   
Bureaucratic quality    -0.174 
(0.811) 
  
Rule of law      -0.625 
(0.762) 
 
POLCON       -4.615** 
(2.010) 
Resource exports (ln) 
*Lack of corruption 
0.655*** 
(0.222) 
   





Resource exports (ln) 
*Rule of law 
   0.331 
(0.320) 
 
Resource exports (ln) 
*POLCON 
    0.943 
(0.763) 
Wald Chi
2 315.18 277.76 285.27  1023.18 
2










N observations  844  955  955  1629 
N countries  90  98  98  109 
 
Note: Dependent variable is GS rate (GS/GNI). Year dummies included, but coefficients not 
shown.   * Significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
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